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Introduction
One of the major impediments to financing adaptation to climate
change is the legal mechanisms thus far developed that control financing
adaptation to climate change.
“Common but differentiated responsibility” (CBDR) is not only an
emerging principle of customary international environmental law; it is also
the ethical and legal anchor of the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC)1 and the Kyoto Protocol.2 Those who have contributed
least to global climate change will bear the greatest burden of its ravages.
While CBDR requires that all nations contribute to climate change
mitigation and adaptation, developed (“Northern”3) nations have a legal
obligation to make greater contributions. The legal obligations encoded in
the climate change conventions, which require disparate contributions to
mitigation and adaptation, stem from pragmatic reality rooted in ethical
obligation. Pragmatically, those nations who have the resources to mitigate
and help others adapt bear primary responsibility to do so; ethically, because
those resources are derived from activities that pollute(d) the global
commons, polluting nations should bear the primary responsibility to clean
up the global atmospheric commons and help others adapt to the mess we
have made en route to economic ascendancy.
However, under the Kyoto Protocol, various “flexibility mechanisms”
allow Northern nations and private actors to avoid meeting their committed
amount of emissions reductions. Instead, they can trade credits allowing
pollution, and offset emissions by investing in Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) projects in developing (Southern) nations.4 Under the
Kyoto Protocol, these CDM projects are also the primary means of helping
Southern nations adapt to global climate change.5 Financial and legal

1. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771
U.N.T.S. 107, 31 I.L.M. 849 (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994) [hereinafter].
2. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
3. Or “Annex 1” nations in the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol. I will use the more
general “Northern” and “Southern” nations throughout.
4. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, Articles 6, 12, & 17. The Clean Development
Mechanism allows Northern nations or private entities to continue to emit a certain
amount of greenhouse gases in exchange for reducing emissions the same amount
in a Southern nation.
5. Ian H. Rowlands, Atmosphere and Outer Space, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 315, 331 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2007).
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systems that harness these flexibility mechanisms are developing with
breakneck speed under the formal international legal regime, and an
exploding voluntary market in carbon trading and carbon offsets rides their
coattails (or, more accurately, leads). Actors in the North have invested
much ingenuity in developing systems of greenhouse gas trading and offsets
that have overshadowed international negotiations on creative, effective,
alternative next steps to mitigate and adapt to global climate change.
Under the Kyoto Protocol, Northern actors are allowed to continue to
emit greenhouse gases to the extent that they “offset” those emissions
through reforestation efforts, often in the global South.6 In the voluntary
market, private actors develop reforestation or “avoided deforestation”
projects, whose carbon credits they sell to investors. Many private actors in
the global North profit economically from forest carbon offset (“FCO”)
projects that may help local human and nonhuman communities in the
global South adapt to climate change, but that may also do them more harm
than good.
At the heart of the critique I offer of most current FCO adaptation
schemes is this: FCOs are not often based on ecological necessity,
sustainable development needs, or on the legal/ethical obligation of
common but differentiated responsibility. Rather, they focus on economic
efficiency. The criteria for much international climate change “aid” is not
necessarily about mitigating greenhouse gas emissions, helping developing
nations or poor communities adapt, or conserving biodiversity. Instead, a
coterie of actors with overlapping interests has devised complex systems
that turn environmental obligations into efficient economic transactions.
FCOs often focus on economic expediency as the primary criterion in
mitigation and adaptation, while doing little to help the poor adapt, which is
exactly the opposite of what CBDR proposes and requires. A major
challenge to helping Southern nations cope with global climate change is to
scuttle this economic focus and instead make genuine adaptation the focus
and not an afterthought of the international climate legal regime. This is
linked to an even greater challenge of developing robust international legal
institutions capable of constraining capitalism in order to ensure the
continued health and survival of human communities and the ecological
communities on which humans depend.
In this paper, I first provide an overview of the treaty framework for
global climate change mitigation and adaptation. I explain the legal
principles – both grounded in the treaty and based on customary norms –
that could or do provide the basis for judging actors in climate change
adaptation. I explain how deforestation contributes to global climate

6. U.N. ENV. PROGR. [UNEP] RISOE CENTRE, LEGAL ISSUES GUIDEBOOK TO THE CLEAN
DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM 42 (2004), http://www.cd4cdm.org/Publications/CDM%20
Legal%20Issues%20 Guidebook.pdf.
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change, and how forest carbon offsets propose to staunch this problem.
Through case studies, I explain the major players in both the CDM and
voluntary market in forest carbon offsets, and how they have created a
system where they benefit economically without necessarily doing much to
mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, conserve biodiversity, or help the poor
adapt to the effects of climate change. I close with a legal analysis of FCOs,
and I propose how to use the law to foment genuine adaptation, including
judicious use of carefully implemented and monitored FCOs, in the global
South. I point to several efforts that are under way to do so, but also point
to the need for strengthened systems of international environmental and
human rights law capable of monitoring and enforcing FCOs.
I do not intend this article as a screed against capitalism. I am not
critiquing the general notion of doing well by doing good; in fact, I entered
into this research hopeful that I would find a paradigmatic example of how
linking social entrepreneurship to capitalism could help save the world by
mitigating greenhouse gas accumulation, using markets to help poor
communities adapt to global climate change, and saving biodiversity at the
same time, while providing the “do-gooder” entrepreneurs with a living.
While I still believe this is possible, it will require much more attention to
international human rights and environmental law, and development of
mechanisms that craft, monitor, and enforce these laws. Indeed, some
efforts are underway that would do much more to promote ecological and
social resiliency in FCOs; I will discuss them below.
However, to the extent that capitalist actors can be judged by their
deeds (not their words), the past decade in FCOs has largely seen the market
replace law and governance, and profit trump social welfare or ecological
function. Projects to sequester carbon in forests have allowed the wealthy
to sequester further wealth far out of proportion to the carbon sequestered.
Without a robust system of international legal principles and enforcement
mechanisms, I believe that tropical forests will continue to disappear,
greenhouse gas concentrations will continue to rise, and the poor (and
perhaps the rich) will be unable to adapt successfully to global climate
change.

Global Climate Change and Forest Carbon Offsets
Industrialization has come with many costs, including widespread
pollution of the global atmospheric commons. As greenhouse gases
(“GHGs”) accumulate in the atmosphere at concentrations significantly
above pre-industrial levels, scientists have sounded the alarm about the
consequences these changes in GHG concentrations portend for human and
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nonhuman communities.7 In recent years, alert citizens and political leaders
have heeded these alarms about global climate change, and have begun to
press for changes to business as usual.
Climate change threatens survival of many species in temperate and
tropical ecosystems, and threatens the functioning of those ecosystems
themselves. For humans, climate change will hit the poor particularly hard,8
as they lack the means to adapt to deepening drought, more violent storms,
elevated heat, increasing floods from melting glaciers, rising sea levels, and
various other (un-) natural9 phenomena. Political and policy responses to
climate change have addressed both mitigation and adaptation. First, it has
seemed sensible to try to reduce the rate at which GHGs are accumulating in
the atmosphere, thus mitigating the problem. But given that the wheels of
climate change have already been set in motion and, despite legal and
voluntary responses, GHG concentrations are still increasing. Therefore,
programs to help human populations adapt to global climate change must
also be established. When I refer to “adaptation” in this paper, I am referring
to building ecological and social community resiliency to climate change.

7. See, most recently, the statement posted by the National Science Academies
of 13 nations, including those of the G-8: Joint Science Academies’ Statement:
Climate Change Adaptation and the Transition to a Low Carbon Society (June 2008),
http://www.nationalacademies.org/includes /climatechangestatement.pdf.
8. Andrew C. Revkin, Poor Nations to Bear Brunt as World Warms, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1,
2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/01/ science/earth/01climate.html;
Patricia Nelson, An African Dimension to the Clean Development Mechanism: Finding a Path to
Sustainable Development in the Energy Sector. 32 DENV. J. INT’L L & POL’Y 615, 619 (2004);
RODA VERHEYEN, CLIMATE CHANGE DAMAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: PREVENTION DUTIES
AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY 34 (2005); M.J. Mace, Adaptation Under the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change: The Legal Framework (Sept. 2003) (presented at
‘Justice in Adaptation to Climate Change,’ at the Zuckerman Institute for Connective
Environmental Research University of East Anglia), http://www.field.org.uk/
files/Adaptation-Tyndall%20Paper-MACEAugust%2023-FINAL.pdf; Kenneth M. Chomitz et
al., At Loggerheads: Agricultural Expansion, Poverty Reduction, and Tropical Forests, WORLD
BANK, 2007, at xi, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/ WDSContentServer/
IW3P/IB/2006/10/19/000112742_20061019150049/additional/ixviiiPRRALFMweb.pdf;
UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008:
FIGHTING CLIMATE CHANGE: HUMAN SOLIDARITY IN A DIVIDED WORLD 8 (2007), [hereinafter
UNDP] (Their 2007 HDR is primarily dedicated to the links between (un)sustainable
development and (un)mitigated global climate change).
9. One of the earliest authors writing for a general audience to presage global
climate change’s ravages was BILL MCKIBBEN, THE END OF NATURE (1989). McKibben
argued that weather phenomena were no longer “natural” because humans were
changing the very climate system that had previously been beyond our means to
impact.
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By ecological resiliency, I mean protecting and preserving the natural
ecosystems that help human communities survive through buffering from
floods, filtering drinking water, stabilizing soil, providing sustainable forest
products, and preserving a host of other ecosystem services necessary for
human survival. (I am not referring to preserving functioning ecosystems
and their myriad component species for their own sake; while this is, to me,
ethical and desirable, and is the subject of other multilateral environment
agreements (MEAs) (e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity, Ramsar
Convention on Wetlands),10 it is by and large not the focus of the legal
climate regime.) By social resiliency, I mean forging the democratic capacity
to help marginalized communities accrue the administrative, technical, and
political power that will help them make difficult decisions and survive the
coming vicissitudes of nature and the coming economic and political
upheavals (some of which are the subject of this paper) that are now
befalling and will continue to befall them.11

The Global Climate Change Treaty Regime
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(“UNFCCC”) set goals for the world’s nations to reduce their greenhouse gas
(“GHG”) emissions in order to mitigate global climate change.12 The 1997
Kyoto Protocol, which entered into effect in 2005, spelled out the terms that
legally bind signatory nations.13 “Annex 1” nations – nations of the “North” –
have been primarily responsible for greenhouse gas (GHG) build-up, and
their economic development has allowed them the financial and technical

10. Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, available at
http://www.cbd.int/convention/convention.shtml; Ramsar Convention on Wetlands,
Ramsar, Iran, 2 Feb. 2, 1971, available at http://www. ramsar.org/key_conv_e.htm.
11. WORLD BANK, BIO CARBON FUND 9-10 (2007), available at; Ramsar Convention
on Wetlands, Ramsar, Iran, 2 Feb. 2, 1971, available at http://www.ramsar.org/
key_conv_e.htm.http://carbonfinance.org/Router.cfm?Page=BioCF&ItemID=9708&FID
=970; C. Bracer, S. Scherr, A. Molnar, M. Sekher, B.O. Ochieng, & G. Sriskanthan,
Organization and Governance for Fostering Pro-Poor Compensation for Environmental Services:
CES Scoping Study Issue Paper no. 4 at 35 (ICRAF Working Paper no. 39, World
Agroforestry Centre, 2007); Brian Walsh, Getting Credit for Saving Trees, TIME July 12,
2007; Alfred Ofosu-Ahenkorah, CDM Participation and Credit Pricing in Africa in EQUAL
EXCHANGE: DETERMINING A FAIR PRICE FOR CARBON 133 (Glenn Hodes & Sami Kamel,
eds.,
2007)
available
at
http://www.cd4cdm.org/Publications/Perspectives/
FairPriceCarbon.pdf; KATOOMBA GROUP, GETTING STARTED: AN INTRODUCTORY PRIMER TO
ASSESSING AND DEVELOPING PAYMENTS FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICE DEALS 17 (2007), available at
http://www.katoombagroup.org/ documents/publications/GettingStarted.pdf.
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means to mitigate this pollution.14
This notion of “common but
differentiated responsibility” (CBDR), which I will explain further below, is
the guiding principle for the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol. Under the rubric of
CBDR, Northern nations pledged themselves to various degrees of
emissions reduction, aiming to reduce GHGs by at least 5 percent below
1990 levels, as measured during the commitment period of 2008-2012.15 All
Northern nations except the U.S. have ratified the Kyoto Protocol.16 By the
Kyoto Protocol’s terms, Southern nations have no binding GHG reduction
targets, but nonetheless under CBDR have joint obligations to work towards
curbing climate change.17

Customary Norms of International Environmental Law
I argue here that Northern nations are legally obligated to provide
adaptation aid to Southern nations that helps communities become more
socially and ecologically resilient when faced with global climate change.
Even if they are not currently legally obliged to do so, I believe private actors
investing in FCOs ought to follow those same legal strictures as anyone
providing adaptation aid. International law should stipulate that any FCOs
that result in a net transfer of wealth from South to North, or that disinvest
poor people of their means of subsistence, are illegal.
While international environmental law usually focuses on the
obligations of nation-actors, many scholars and activists argue that these
same norms should also apply to non-state actors, including multinational
enterprises (MNEs), and international financial institutions (IFIs). An
exhaustive review of this literature is not possible here. Professor Peter
Muchlinski notes, “[a]t present there are no detailed international rules, or
procedures, for the environmental regulation of MNEs.”18 He characterizes
as “weak” the evidence that corporate social actors are liable in domestic
courts for violations of principles of customary international environmental

14. Anita M. Halvorrsen, Common But Differentiated Commitments in the Future Climate
Change Regime: Amending the Kyoto Protocol to Include Annex C and the Annex C Mitigation Fund,
18 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 247, 254-55 (2007).
15. Christopher Carr & Flavia Rosembuj, Flexible Mechanisms for Climate Change
Compliance: Emission Offset Purchases Under the Clean Development Mechanism, 16 N.Y.U.
ENVT’L L.J. 44, 46 (2008).
16. The newly elected Prime Minister of Australia, Kevin Rudd, signed the Kyoto
Protocol as his first act of office on December 3, 2007, leaving the United States alone
among the Northern nations in failing to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Reuters, Australian
Leader Ratifies Kyoto Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2007.
17. Kevin Baumert, Participation of Developing Countries in the International Climate
Change Regime: Lessons for the Future, 38 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 365, 381 (2006).
18.

Peter T. Muchlinski, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES & THE LAW 566 (2007).
45
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law.19 Steven R. Ratner describes the “doctrinal straitjacket” that prioritizes
state responsibility and duties in international environmental law.20 Private
actors may pollute, or, as is the case in FCOs, foment environmental change
across national boundaries. Muchlinski argues that private actors should be
controlled by both home and host country when acting as CDM project
developers, and when acting under the CDM, I believe private actors should
be bound by the legal norms encoded within the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol.21
But while international human rights law requires the home states of these
companies to regulate them from committing human rights violations under
the auspices of the voluntary market, they have little incentive to do so and
face little prospect of sanctions for their failure.22 Host states, particularly in
the South, may lack the expertise, capacity, and power to regulate, and may
be willing to accept whatever Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is proffered,
particularly if powerful elites in the host country are benefiting.23 Thus,
Ratner criticizes the “anachronistic” emphasis on state responsibility in the
age of nimble, protean multinational enterprises.24
Even if private actors are not currently legally bound by international
environmental legal norms, or do not consider themselves legally bound by
them, the norms are available for adoption as ethical principles and “best
practices” that I believe private actors ought to follow. To the extent that
international environmental law does not regulate private actors investing in
FCOs, the international legal system ought to be reformed so that private
actors do have clear legal responsibilities to foment genuine adaptation
within the guiding framework of principles of customary international
environmental law, and legal principles encoded in the UNFCCC/Kyoto
Protocol and its prospective successor.
When considering customary international environmental law, one
must be careful of the “myth system,” i.e., principles that represent the
19.

Id. at 572.

20. Steven R. Ratner, Business, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 5, at 807, 808, 811.
21.

Muchlinski, supra note 18, at 571.

22.

Ratner, supra note 20, at 809.
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23. Id. at 810; BRACER ET AL., supra note 11, at 35; Charlotte Streck, Lucio Pedoni,
Manuel Estrada Porrua, & Michael Dutschke, Creating Incentives for Avoiding Further
Deforestation: The Nested Approach in CHARLOTTE STRECK, ROBERT O’SULLIVAN, TOBY
JANSON-SMITH, & RICHAD TAROSOFSKY, eds., CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS;
EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 240-41 (London, 2008); DAVID
HUMPHREYS, LOGJAM: DEFORESTATION AND THE CRISIS OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 207 (2006);
Tom Griffiths, Seeing ‘Red’? ‘Avoided Deforestation’ and the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples and Local Communities, Forest Peoples Programme, at 5, 13, 14 (June 2007),
http://www.forestpeoples.org/documents/ifi_igo/avoided_deforestation _red_jun07_eng.pdf.
24.
46
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cherished norms of international environmental lawyers and activists, but
don’t reflect actual state practice.25 With that proviso, legal scholars see a
number of principles of environmental law as emerging customary
international law, finding their way into international and regional
conventions, national constitutions, and international and domestic legal
opinions.26 Several of these codify principles of equity where international
environmental law coincides with international human rights law, where
commitment to the environment dovetails with commitment to social
justice. At very least, these principles provide a guiding framework for a
robust system of international environmental legal principles that ought to
guide FCOs and ought to bind all actors (state and private) who develop and
monitor FCO projects.

Preventative Principle
The arbitration panel for the famous 1937 Trail Smelter case named the
preventative principle: “no State has the right to use or permit the use of its
territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of
another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious
consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.”27
This is both about damage to territory, and the health of “persons” living in
that neighboring territory.
The preventative principle has become a
cornerstone of customary international environmental law, as embodied by
Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, requiring a kind of due
diligence, or state “responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”28 The UNFCCC’s
Preamble reifies Principle 21, emphasizing that while States have “the
sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental and developmental policies,” they nonetheless must refrain
from causing “damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond

25. Daniel Bodansky, Customary (and Not So Customary) International Environmental
Law, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 105, 116 (1995).
26. For a good review, see Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Customary Law and General
Principles, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 5,
at 449, 453. Dupuy states that “customary international environmental law is both
omnipresent and of paramount importance.”
27. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int’l Arb. Awards 1905 (Trail Smelter
Arb. Trib. 1938 & 1941).
28. U.N. Env. Progr. [UNEP], Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment (June 5-16, 1972), Principle 21, available at http://www.unep.org/
Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=97&ArticleID=1503.
47
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the limits of national jurisdiction.29 In the context of climate change, this is an
equity argument for mitigation; i.e., polluters should emphasize preventing
GHG emissions. It is also an argument that FCOs fomenting adaptation
across boundaries should not damage the host country’s environment.

Polluter Pays Principle
As Northern nations continue to emit vast quantities of GHGs, they
violate the preventative principle, and thus the polluter pays principle steps in
as backstop. The Rio Declaration’s Principle 16 prescribes: “National
authorities should endeavor to promote the internalization of environmental
costs and use of economic instruments, taking into account the approach
that the polluter should, in principle, bear the costs of pollution.”30 Taken in
conjunction with CBDR (see below), this is a moral and legal presumption
that those whose pollution is causing global climate change should also be
mitigating GHG emissions and helping others adapt to the pollution’s
negative toll.31 Sunstein describes such GHG pollution as a kind of tort,
where polluters who have gained economically from their pollution ought to
pay for the damage they have caused.32 The polluter pays principle is the
most robust example of duties that apply to transnational corporations,
found in numerous multilateral environmental agreements that direct legal
responsibility on corporations for transboundary pollution they create.33 To
the extent that FCOs constitute appropriate “payment” for past GHG
pollution, they fulfill a customary international environmental legal
obligation that the polluter should pay for its acts. But FCOs that
compensate the project developer, rather than the communities harmed by
climate change, violate this legal precept.

Environmental Democracy
Environmental democracy is an emerging norm at the intersection of
environmental and human rights law.34 Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration
29.

UNFCCC, supra note 1, Preamble.

30. U.N. Env. Progr. [UNEP], Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development, (June 3-14, 1992), available at
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=78&ArticleID
=1163 [hereinafter Rio].
31.

UNDP, supra note 8, at 41.

32. Cass Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 1, 54 (2007).
33.

Ratner, supra note 20, at 813.

34. SUMUDU A. ATAPATTU, EMERGING PRINCIPLES
LAW 289 (2006).
48
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encourages access to pertinent information for citizens affected by
environmental decisions, the right to participate in decision making
processes, and the right to access all judicial and administrative
proceedings including redress and remedy.35 The October 2007 U.N. “[n]onlegally binding instrument on all types of forests” declares that “local
communities, forest owners and other relevant stakeholders contribute to
achieving sustainable forest management and should be involved in a
transparent and participatory way in forest decision-making processes that
affect them, as well as in implementing sustainable forest management, in
accordance with national legislation.”36 Also under this aegis fits the
requirement of Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) with full public
input and participation,37 and a general right of access to just governance.
The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Aarhus
Convention is at the forefront of attempts to codify and implement these
principles of environmental democracy, but they are finding their way into
other multinational environment agreements (MEAs) and into national
constitutions or statutes.38 Citizens – particularly those who are likely to be
affected by an FCO – should be able to review and comment before any
trading scheme is implemented, and should be able to prevent unjust
trading schemes. In fact, in an ideal environmental democracy, these offsets
should be proposed by community members whose forests are to become
marketable carbon reservoirs.

Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR)
Northern nations are legally obliged to fund mitigation and adaptation
strategies in the South that will help avoid human rights and ecological
cataclysms that result from the North’s responsibility for creating climate
change. The legal obligations come first from CBDR’s status as an emerging
principle of customary international environmental law.39 But CBDR is also
the explicit legal foundation of the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol, as named in
Article 3 of the UNFCCC:

35.

Rio, supra note 30, Principle 10.

36. U.N. Forum on Forests, Oct. 17, 2007, Non-Legally Binding Instrument on All
Types of Forests, U.N. Document A/C.2/62/L.5 (Oct. 22, 2007).
37. Rio supra note 30, Principle 17; Ulrich Beyerlin, Different Types of Norms in
International Environmental Law: Policies, Principles, and Rules, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 425, supra note 5, at 439.
38. U.N. Econ. Comm’n for Europe, Convention on Access to Information,
Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, U.N.
Document. ECE/CEP/43 (June 25, 1998), available at http://www.unece.org/env/pp/
documents/cep43e.pdf.
39.

Halvorrsen, supra note 15, at 254.
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The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of
present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity
and in accordance with their common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities.
Accordingly, the
developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate
change and the adverse effects thereof.40
This principle of CBDR appears throughout the UNFCCC and Kyoto
Protocol.41 CBDR has been called the “ethical anchor” of the Kyoto Protocol.
One could also call it the legal anchor.42 Because Northern nations have
created and continue to create disproportionate GHG pollution (e.g., the 19
million residents of New York State produce more GHGs than the 766
million people living in the 50 least-developed countries;43 the U.S. currently
produces about 19 percent of GHGs44 and has emitted 30 percent of GHGs
between 1850-200045) and disproportionately profit from it, and because
Southern nations will disproportionately suffer from climate change’s
ravages, the North has the legal responsibility – and the financial and
technological means – to mitigate the problem.46
FCO projects that respect CBDR and genuinely mitigate Northern
emissions while helping the South adapt to global climate change would
help fulfill this obligation; but any such projects that allow the North to
evade legal responsibility to reduce their own emissions, and that further
undercut the South’s ability to adopt, violate the equity-enhancing
underpinnings of CBDR. Southern nations also have CBDR obligations
under the climate treaties, i.e., while they have no binding emissions
reduction targets, they must still work to mitigate climate change. For
example, they must establish a Designated National Authority (DNA) who

40.

UNFCCC, supra note 1, Art. 3.

41. Id., Preamble; Art. 4, para. 1; Art 4, para 4(1)(e); Art 4, para. 3; Art 4(7);
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, Art 10; Art 10(c).
42. Lavanya Rajamani, The Nature, Promise, and Limits of Differential Treatment in the
Climate Regime, 16 YB IEL 81, 86 (2007).
43.

UNDP, supra note 8, at 43.

44. Pew Center on Global Climate Change, http://www.pewclimate.org/ factsand-figures/international/annual-emissions.
45. Pew Center on Global Climate Change, http://www.pewclimate.org/ factsand-figures/international/cumulative.
46. Philippe Cullet & Annie Patricia Kameri-Mbote, Activities Implemented Jointly in
the Forestry Sector: Conceptual and Operational Fallacies, 10 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV., 98, 102
(1997); Halvorssen, supra note 15, at 254.
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will assist CDM project developers and will approve or reject proposed CDM
projects.47
As noted above, principles of international environmental law tend to
apply to nation states, but not private actors. Whether or not private actors
working to develop CDM FCOs under the Kyoto Protocol are bound by the
legal principles that undergird the treaty remains unclear. When the climate
conventions discuss CBDR, it is in the context of “Parties,” and these Parties
are nation-states. For example, the Preamble to the UNFCCC “calls for the
widest possible cooperation by all countries and their participation in an
effective and appropriate international response, in accordance with their
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and
their social and economic conditions . . . .”48
One could argue that where the treaties do not specify that Parties are
states, they are referring more generally to a broader array of actors with
legal duties. But the UNFCCC always refers to “Parties” in a context where
the clearest legal reading is to States as parties. While the UNFCCC does
not define “Party,” the Kyoto Protocol does: “‘Party’ means, unless the
context otherwise indicates, a Party to this Protocol.”49 Article 12.9 of the
Kyoto Protocol permits “[p]articipation under the clean development
mechanism, including in activities mentioned in paragraph 3(a)50 above and
in the acquisition of certified emission reductions, may involve private
and/or public entities, and is to be subject to whatever guidance may be
provided by the Executive Board (EB) of the clean development
mechanism.”51 Thus private entities participate in CDM project development
(and indeed are the primary proponents of these projects), but it remains
unclear whether they are “Parties” who are legally required to operate within
the CBDR framework that guides State actors.
Absent clear guidance from the EB or the Conference of the Parties
(COP), a narrow reading of the legal obligations of CBDR seems appropriate.
International law depends on the nation state as duty bearer and
prosecutor.52 And in FCOs, nation states are in violation of the various
principles, including the explicitly codified CBDR. Northern nation states
are seldom the direct investors in FCOs, either under the CDM or voluntarily
47. Karen Capoor & Philippe Ambrosi, State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2006:
Focus on Africa, WORLD BANK, 2006, at 24, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/
default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/02/26/000090341_20070226114316/Render
ed/PDF/386180AFR0Carb1s1on1Africa01PUBLIC1.pdf.
48.

UNFCCC, supra note 1, Preamble.

49.

Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, Art 1.6.

50. Id., Paragraph 3(a) of Art. 12: “Parties not included in Annex I will benefit
from project activities resulting in certified emission reductions.”
51.

Id., Art 12.9.

52.

Ratner, supra note 23, at 807, 808, 811, 816.
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(although Norway is planning to invest over a half-billion U.S. dollars per
year in these projects in a drive to become “carbon neutral”53). But Northern
nations are failing to take significant steps to help Southern nations adapt,
either as part of the formal climate change legal regime or otherwise. And
they are failing to police their private actors who are profiting handsomely
from FCOs, whether or not these projects do anything to help Southern
communities adapt to GCC. Southern nations are not exempt from CBDR
responsibilities; at very least, under the CDM, their DNAs should refuse to
permit FCOs that do not help – and may hurt – local communities,54 or are
questionable ecologically (e.g., using non-native species like eucalyptus55).
But what power or incentives do cash-strapped Southern nations really have
against powerful Northern capitalists (or their own elites who may be
profiting) who see in their forests new sources of profit, and who are
spinning carbon into gold?

The Clean Development Mechanism
Northern nations can escape real reductions to emissions through a
variety of “flexibility mechanisms.” They can trade emissions credits
amongst themselves,56 or invest in Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
projects in the South.57 The CDM hypothetically allows Northern nations to
transfer clean technology and wealth to Southern nations to help the latter
develop sustainably and cleanly, while allowing Northern nations to offset

53. Elisabeth Rosenthal, Lofty Pledge to Cut Emissions Comes With Caveat in Norway,
N.Y. TIMES, March 22 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/22/world/europe/
22norway.html?scp=1&sq=Rosenthal+Norway&st=nyt.
54. Capoor & Ambrosi, supra note 47, at 24; Johannes Ebeling, Risks and
Criticisms of Forestry-Based Climate Change Mitigation and Carbon Trading in, Streck et al.
eds., supra note 23, at 54.
55. Larry Lohmann, Carbon Trading: A Critical Conversation on Climate Change,
Privatization and Power, DAG HAMMARSKJOLD CENTRE DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE NO. 48, Sept.
2006, at 227, 238, 240, 267, 306, http://www.dhf.uu.se/pdffiler/DD2006_48_carbon_
trading/carbon_trading_web_HQ.pdf. Non-natives, including Eucalyptus, are to be
planted as part of both the Chinese and Tanzanian case studies I discuss here; See
Facilitating Reforestation for Guangxi Watershed Management in Pearl River Basin: Project Design
Document, July 21, 2006 at 2, 13, 24, http://cdm.unfccc.int/User Management
/FileStorage/7Y41M57708ZDR95GDFS8LGOZLPC7ZL [hereinafter PDD Guangxi];
Afforestation in grassland areas of Uchindile, Kilombero, Tanzania & Mapanda, Mufindi, Tanzania:
Project Design Document, July 26, 2007, at 4, 5, 15, http://www.netinform.net/
KE/files/pdf/PDD_GRL_version_26July_rev3.pdf [hereinafter PDD Uchindile].

52

56.

Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, Art. 17; Halvorrsen, supra note 30 at 257.

57.

Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, Art. 6.
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their emissions requirements in an inexpensive way.58 The UNFCCC and
Kyoto Protocol repeatedly refer to the primary interest of Southern nations
in the “sustainable development” aspects of the climate treaty regime.59
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore just what “sustainable
development” means in this context,60 FCOs under the CDM should at least
be furthering the social development needs of local populations and
contributing to intragenerational and intergenerational equity while
preserving the natural environment on which that development depends.61
The Conference of Parties (“COP”) to the climate accords have
specified that flexibility mechanisms, including the CDM, are meant to be
“supplemental” to the real domestic reductions in GHG; such domestic
actions are meant to comprise a “significant element” in GHG emissions
required by the Kyoto Protocol.62 What constitutes “supplemental” or
“significant” is not specified.
While the CDM was meant to benefit a wide range of Southern nations,
more than 80 percent of CDM projects have been directed towards China,
India, Mexico and Brazil.63 China has generated about 50 percent of the
projects representing 60 percent of the volume of emissions reduction
credits between 2002 and 2006 within the CDM.64 China’s advanced
infrastructure is well equipped to undertake the bureaucratic and technical
requirements of the CDM, and private actors are eager to gain footholds in
lucrative Chinese markets.65
The CDM bears little resemblance to its original concept as proposed
by Brazil when the Kyoto Protocol was being negotiated. Supported by the

58.

Rowlands, supra note 5 at 315, 331.

59. UNFCCC, supra note 2, Art. 3.5; Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, Art 2.1, Art .10,
Art. 12.2.
60.

See Daniel Barstow Magraw & Lisa D. Hawke, Sustainable Development, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 614, supra note 5, at 618.
Aside from its explicit references in the climate change treaties, “sustainable
development” is an emerging customary norm of international environmental law.
Id., at 619-620; EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS:
INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTER-GENERATIONAL EQUITY 3 (1989); Nonlegally binding instrument, supra note 36, at 104; ATAPATTU, supra note 35, at 78.
61.

62. UNFCCC, Report on the Conference of the Parties on Its Seventh Session,
Held at Marrakesh From 29 October to 10 November 2001, Principles, nature and scope of
the mechanisms pursuant to Articles 6, 12 and 17 of the Kyoto Protocol, Decision 15/CP.7, ¶ 8
(Sept. 11, 2001).
63. U.N. Env. Progr. [UNEP] Risoe Centre, CDM projects by host region (Oct. 1,
2008), http://cdmpipeline.org/cdm-projects-region.htm.
64. Id.
65.

Carr & Rosembuj, supra note 15, at 53.
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G-77 nations and China, Brazil had proposed a mechanism that would
forecast Northern emissions for the treaty’s commitment period. Countries
that failed to meet their emissions targets would face a “compulsory
contribution” – i.e., a fine – of US$10 for every one ton over their ceiling,
which would go to funding climate change mitigation and adaptation
projects in the South. Thus, the fund was envisioned as a “stick” that would
compel the North to meet its commitments and would fund “clean
development” in the South if the North failed.66
Led by the U.S. during Kyoto negotiations, Northern nations instead
turned the CDM into a mechanism to provide climate-friendly and profitgenerating investment in the South in exchange for the carbon saved to
offset the required reductions proposed by the treaty. In other words, rather
than a fine that compels compliance, the CDM became a means for the
North – and particularly its businesses – to avoid meeting targeted, required
GHG reductions.67 Unlike most other MEAs, private actors may also
participate in generating projects under the CDM by developing, financing,
and supervising projects under the CDM.68 Private actors can use CDM
projects to offset requirements that may have been imposed on them by
their governments, or they can profit financially by selling or trading credits
to other actors (private or governmental) who must meet emissions
reduction targets. Much, if not most of the U.N.-sponsored effort in the past
ten years around climate change has gone into making a functional CDM,
much to the benefit of business interests around the world. Private actors
generated $US30 billion per year worth of CDM projects in 2006, the first
year after the Kyoto Protocol went into effect.69 As we shall see here, private
actors have further undermined Brazil’s original proposal, as they have
found multifarious ways to profit from the mechanism while evading real
reductions in GHG emissions.

Current Adaptation Efforts
The UNFCCC’s Article 2 prioritizes stabilizing GHG concentrations “to
allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food
production is not threatened and to enable economic development to

66. Jacob Werksman, The Clean Development Mechanism: Unwrapping the ‘Kyoto
Surprise.’ 7(2) REV. EURO. COMMM & INTN’L ENVTL. L. 147, 151 (1998).
67.

Id. at 152.

68.

Laurence Boisson De Chazournes, Technical and Financial Assistance, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 947, supra note 5, at 969.
69. UNFCCC, The Mechanisms Under the Kyoto Protocol: Emissions Trading,
the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation, http://unfccc.int/
kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/items/1673.php (last visited Oct. 20, 2008).
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proceed in a sustainable manner.”70 Article 4.4 specifies that the “developed
country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II shall also
assist the developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the
adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those
adverse effects.”71 Article 4.8 names the specific adaptation needs of, inter
alia, island nations, nations with low-lying coastal areas, nations with areas
liable to drought, forest decay, natural disasters and fragile ecosystems.72
The Kyoto Protocol requires that part of CDM funds be used “to assist
developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse
effects of climate change to meet the costs of adaptation.”73 This was later
set as a kind of tax of 2 percent of all certified emissions reductions (CERs)
generated by CDM projects.74 The Adaptation Fund of the CDM, operated by
the Global Environment Facility,75 is expected to bring in $US80 million to
$US300 million ayear between now and 2012.76
The money is much needed. Action on adaptation under the
UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol has been slow,77 and plans to implement
adaptation aid have lagged behind other programs – and, in particular, have
lagged behind efforts to implement the CDM, a flexibility mechanism
Northern nations have been keen on developing for reasons I elaborate in
this article. Eleven years after the Kyoto Protocol was established, and three

70.

UNFCCC, supra note 1, Art 2.

71. UNFCCC, supra note 1, Art 4.4. Art 4.9 reiterates that “The Parties shall take
full account of the specific needs and special situations of the least developed
countries in their actions with regard to funding and transfer of technology.”
72.

UNFCCC, supra note 1, Art 4.9.

73.

Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, Art. 12.8.

74. UNFCCC, Cooperation & Support, Financial Mechanism, Adaptation Fund,
http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/items/3659.php (last
visited Oct. 20, 2008).
75. UNFCCC, Dialogue on long-term cooperative action to address climate
change by enhancing implementation of the Convention, Report on the analysis of existing
and potential investment and financial flows relevant to the development of an effective and
appropriate international response to climate change, Fourth workshop, Vienna, August 27–31,
2007, Dialogue working paper 8 at 6 (2007),http://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_and_
support/financial_mechanism/financial_mechanism_gef/application/pdf/dialogue
_working _paper_8.pdf.
76.

Id.

77. The Bali Action Plan calls for enhanced action on adaptation, including all
the basic steps one would have expected to have occurred long ago. UNFCCC,
Decision-/CP 13, Bali Action Plan (Advance unedited version), http://unfccc.int/
files/meetings/cop_13/application/pdf/cp_bali_action.pdf.
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years after it has gone into effect, little progress has been made on
guidelines for appropriate use of the Adaptation Fund.78
Progress on adaptation has also been slow outside the auspices of the
formal climate change treaty regime. Contrary to the requirements of CBDR,
Northern nations have spent only about $US40 million a year in voluntary aid to
help Southern nations adapt; northern nations have spent about $US40 billion a
year helping themselves adapt.79 Kevin Watkins, of the United Nations Human
Development Report Office, notes that this “borders on the derisory,”80 and
Archbishop Desmond Tutu has called this “climate change apartheid.”81

Forest Carbon Offsets (FCOs)
Half of the global terrestrial carbon pool is stored in forests.82 Tropical
deforestation accounts for 11 percent to 28 percent of GHG emissions.83 Africa
alone is losing nearly 10 million acres of forest each year.84 The UNDP reports
that continued deforestation from Indonesia and Brazil alone equals 80
percent of the GHG emissions savings achieved if all Annex 1 nations were to
meet their Kyoto Protocol goals in the 2008-2012 commitment period.85
Northern investment in Southern forest preservation and reforestation
is rapidly gaining currency both as one scheme to mitigate GHG buildup,
and to help some communities and nations adapt to the ravages of global
climate change.86 In an FCO, a project developer plants trees to reforest a
degraded ecosystem, or ensures that a forest that would have otherwise

78.

Id.

79.

Revkin, Poor, supra note 8.

80.

Id.

81.

UNDP, supra note 8, at 166.

82. U.N. Env. Progr. [UNEP], World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Reducing
Emissions From Deforestation: a Key Opportunity for Attaining Multiple Benefits (Feb. 23,
2007), at 4, available at http://www.unep-wcmc.org/resources/publications/unep_
wcmc%20RED%20Feb07.pdf.
83. Id., at 4 cites 18 percent to 25 percent; Figure of 11 percent to 28 percent
from UNDP, supra note 8, at 41. UNDP also notes that transportation and power
generation in the North are bigger contributors to GCC than tropical deforestation.
84. LeMonde, L’Afrique perd plus de 4 millions d’hectares de forêt chaque année, selon
l’ONU, LEMONDE, June 10, 2008, http://www.lemonde.fr/sciences-et-environnement/
portfolio/2008/06/10/deforestation-inquietante-en-afrique_ 1056434_3244.html.
85. Marcio Santilli, Paulo Moutinho, Stephan Schwartzman, Daniel Nepstad,
Lisa Curran, & Carlos Nobre, Tropical Deforestation and the Kyoto Protocol: a new proposal,
submitted to COP-9, Dec. 1-12, 2003, at 2.
86. E.g., World Bank Carbon Finance Unit, Bio Carbon Fund, http://
carbonfinance.org/Router.cfm?Page=BioCF&ItemID=9708&FID=9708.
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been degraded or felled is, instead, preserved. The developer can then sell
the carbon, in the form of CERs now sequestered in the trees and soil, for a
contracted period of time. Proponents of FCOs argue that these projects
will mitigate GHG accumulation globally, preserve vital ecosystems that
help buffer the effects of global climate change and help sustain ecosystem
services communities require locally, and also preserve biodiversity and
generate ecologically sustainable new forms of wealth to community
members living near forested lands.87 Preserving forests helps to stabilize
local climate fluctuations, prevent drought, protect aquifers, maintain
pollinator populations, stabilize soil, buffer communities from natural
disasters, allow a source of sustainable forest products, and preserve forestrelated options for the future.88
FCOs were a prominent topic at the December 2007 COP to the
UNFCCC in Bali,89 and will likely be expanded as part of the CDM or similar
mechanism in the post-2012 successor to the Kyoto Protocol.90 Outside the
ambit of the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol, voluntary markets in carbon offsets
are booming, with an array of businesses helping other businesses,
individuals, and municipalities to offset their carbon footprints.91
Current Kyoto Protocol rules allow only 1 percent of carbon credits
under the CDM to be allotted for projects in Land Use, Land-Use Change
and Forestry (LULUCF).92 Projects that prevent deforestation are currently
excluded from CDM eligibility, but it is expected they will be a part of the
87. Santilli et al., supra note 85, at 5; Imke Sagemüller Forest Sinks Under the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol: Opportunity or
Risk for Biodiversity, 31 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 189, 191 (2006); UNEP World Conservation
Monitoring Centre, supra note 82, at 12; Nelson, supra note 8, at 615, 622.
88. UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre, supra note 82, at 9-10; Stefano
Pagiola, Natasha Landell-Mills, & Joshua Bishop, Making Market-based Mechanisms Work for
Forests and People in STEFANO PAGIOLA, JOSHUA BISHOPP, & NATASHA LANDELL-MILLS, SELLING
FOREST ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES: MARKET-BASED MECHANISMS FOR CONSERVATION AND
DEVELOPMENT 224 (London, 2002). Certified Emission Reductions Sale and Purchase
Agreement (CERSPA), Guidance Document Version 1.0, Apr. 2007, www.cerspa.org; David
Freestone, Foreword in Streck et al., supra note 23, at xii.]]
89. Andrew C. Revkin, Delegates in Bali for Climate Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec 2, 2007,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/02/science/earth/02cnd-bali.html?ex=
1197262800&en=cb0edc2c0fce1ee7&ei=5070&emc=eta1; Peter Gelling, Forest Loss in
Sumatra Becomes a Global Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2007, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2007/12/06/world/asia/06indo.html?hp.
90.

Id.

91. Int’l Inst. for Env. Dev. [IIED] & World Wildlife Fund [WWF], Climate, Carbon,
Conservation and Communities: An IIED/WWF Briefing 2 (2007), available at http://www.
iied.org/pubs/pdf/full/17011IIED.pdf.
92.

Capoor & Ambrosi, supra note 47, at 23; Sagemüller, supra note 87, at 192.
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successor to the Kyoto Protocol.93 However, reforestation projects are
currently permitted.94 Only one such project has thus far been registered,
which I will use as a case study.95 Others are in development or await
approval.96
Many Kyoto Protocol signatories were skeptical about these projects,
and therefore circumscribed their inclusion as CDM-eligible.97 Skeptics
claim that FCOs have problems with leakage (communities that formerly
relied upon a forest are likely to cut trees elsewhere;98 a government may
preserve one forest from planned logging and instead offer timber
concessions elsewhere; logging companies denied concession rights in one
country may instead cut timber in a neighboring country);99 permanence
(forests burn or get chopped down);100 quantifiability (FCOs pose technical
challenges of calculating present and future carbon stored in forests,
particularly under different climate change scenarios);101 and additionality
(project developers must show the project would not have been undertaken
but for the FCO). When such additionality is false – as it has been shown to
be in as many as 20 percent of CDM projects102 – they result in a net increase
in GHG emissions.103 Thus FCOs do not mitigate climate change, and may
well increase GHG emissions.104

93.

UNEP, supra note 6.

94.

Id.

95.

IIED & WWF, supra note 91, at 2-3.

96. Bruno Locatelli, Lucio Pedroni, & Zenia Salinas, ‘Design Issues in Clean
Development Mechanism Forestry Projects’ in Streck et al., supra note 23 at 108.
97.

Sagemüller, supra note 87, at 192.

98. Id., at 196; Nelson, supra note 8, at 645; Ebeling, supra note 55, at 50; Cullet
& Kameri-Mbote, supra note 47, at 98.
99. Ebeling, supra note 55, at 51; Cullet & Kameri-Mbote, supra note 47, at 111;
WORLD BANK CARBON FINANCE UNIT, FOREST CONCEPT PARTNERSHIP FACILITY [FCPF] CONCEPT
NOTE 4 (2007), available at http://carbonfinance.org/docs/FCPF_Concept_Note_
FINAL.pdf; Gary C. Bryner, Carbon Markets: Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions Through
Emissions Trading 17 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 267, 291, 296 (2004).
100. PHILIPPE CULLET, DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 124 (2007); Sagemüller, supra note 87, at 195; UNEP World Conservation
Monitoring Centre, supra note 82, at 4-5; Ebeling, supra note 55, at 47.
101. Walsh, supra note 11; Baumert, supra note 17, at 396; Cullet & KameriMbote, supra note 47, at 99.
102.

Revkin, Poor, supra note 8.

103. Marisa Meizlish & David Brand, Developing Forestry Carbon Projects for the
Voluntary Carbon Market: A Practical Analysis in Streck et al., eds., supra note 23, at 317;
Lohmann, supra note 55, at 145; Sebastian M. Scholz & Martina Jung, Forestry Projects
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But Southern nations have a strong incentive (i.e., cash and
technology transfer) to assert that projects were not planned, even if they
were; and Northern countries have strong incentive to fund these projects,
which are often a inexpensive way of buying the right to pollute more at
home and to please domestic private investors.105 Furthermore, opponents
of these projects argue that few financial benefits of such schemes are likely
to reach those who live in and around forests, and in fact may be captured
by national governments or corrupt, elite, local and national figures.106 They
worry that local communities will lose the livelihoods they derive from
forests.107 However, multiple forces are pushing for expansion of CDM
forestry projects, and preparatory workshops and conferences have taken
place to prepare the ground for this expansion in the successor to the Kyoto
Protocol.108

Why FCOs are such a big deal now and a bigger deal in future
Some experts forecast that the carbon industry will grow to as much as
$US1trillion a year within a decade, possibly becoming the world’s leading
commodity market.109 A multitude of businesses take part in the financial
action.
Some seek inexpensive ways to offset government-required
emissions reductions; some turn those required reductions into profit
making as they reduce emissions more than required and are able to sell the
remaining credits. The forests of the global South offer an alluring financial
and ecological sink: If you can pay poor governments and/or poor people to
reforest or not deforest, and you can get credit for the resulting saved carbon
credit that you can use to offset your emissions, you can both sell your
emissions reduction credits, and continue business as usual in the North.
London is the global capital of an industry where asset managers broker

under the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation: Rules and Regulations in Streck
et al., eds., supra note 23, at 76-77.
104.

Sagemüller, supra note 87, at 192.

105.

Nelson, supra note 8, at 645.

106.

Griffiths, supra note 23, at 5.

107.

Id.

108. E.g. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Subsidiary Body for
Scientific and Technological Advice, Twenty-sixth session, May 7-18, 2007, Report on
the second workshop on reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries, ¶44, U.N.
Doc. FCCC/SBSTA/2007/3 (Apr. 17, 2007); Gelling, supra note 89.
109. James Kanter, In London’s Financial World, Carbon Trading is the Next Big Thing,
N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/06/business/worldbusiness/
06carbon.html.
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these deals and guide other businesses through the tortuous ins and outs of
the emerging carbon market.110
While the CDM has circumscribed their eligibility, FCOs are thriving as
part of the broader voluntary carbon offset market. As of 2006, more than 30
companies were selling carbon offsets to individuals and companies wishing
to offset their carbon footprints.111 In 2006, the voluntary market for carbon
offsets brought in US$110 million.112 That figure is expected to grow to
US$40 billion by 2010.113 Merrill Lynch has just become the first Wall Street
firm to invest big time in FCOs, spending $US9 million to preserve a 1.9
million-acre forest in Sumatra.114 Outside the bounds of formal regulation, a
host of MNEs, NGOs, and IFIs are investing in these FCOs, with potential to
wield powerful influence on how human and ecological communities are
configured in distant lands. They are deriving their own codes of conduct for
how they will proceed. I shall trace the various actors who stand to profit
and lose from this voluntary FCO market, and shall explain the implications
of this market for mitigating global climate change and for regulating (or
not) how MNEs respond to the crisis of global climate change.

Case Studies
Introduction
In China, the Guangxi Watershed Management FCO employs rural
villagers to reforest nearly 10,000 acres of degraded land.115 Guangxi is the
first land use project approved by the CDM. The project is small, but is seen
as a “testing ground” where participants are “learning by doing.”116
Specifically, project investors are testing the technical challenges to
achieving “credible carbon sequestration” while “pilot[ing] the viability of
enhancing the livelihoods of people and natural environment.”117 The
plantations are described in the Project Design Document (PDD) as a

110.

Id.

111. TREXLER CLIMATE & ENERGY SERVICES, A CONSUMER’S GUIDE TO RETAIL CARBON
OFFSET PROVIDERS at iii (2006), http://www.cleanair-coolplanet.org/ConsumersGuide
toCarbonOffsets.pdf.
112.
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“virtual cash crop” for the local people who will profit both from harvesting
the trees at the end of the commitment period and from selling the carbon
credits.118 The PDD also cites the ecosystem services benefits the project
provides – preserving not just carbon, but also soil, water, and
biodiversity.119
In this project, the actors are: a) a private forestry firm, Guangxi
Huanjiang Xinghuan Forestry Development Company Ltd., which will
acquire (and can then sell) the emissions reduction credits of the project; b)
the World Bank; c) the governments of Spain, Italy, and China; d) the Global
Environment Facility (GEF); and e) TÜV SÜD, an MNE that verifies CDM
eligibility.
In the Tanzanian CDM proposal (which I shall abbreviate “Unchindle”
or “Tanzania”), project developers seek to reforest about 18,000 hectares of
currently “degraded” rural land.120 While this scheme is ostensibly about
storing carbon, mitigating global climate change, re-establishing forests,
and improving Southern rural livelihoods, it also generates profits for
numerous private corporations. The MNE actors here are: 1) Green
Resources, Ltd., a Norwegian/Tanzanian tree products company; 2)
Industrikraft Midt-Norge, a Norwegian energy company and/or other
potential carbon purchasers; 3) again, TÜV SÜD, the CDM project verifier;
and 4) SGS, a global standards and verification firm that advises the project
developers.

World Bank
The Xinghuan Forestry Development Company Ltd. will sell as many as
500,000 temporary Certified Emissions Reductions (tCERs) per year to the
World Bank for fifteen years.121 They are “temporary” because they expire in
15 years, after which the project participants can renegotiate another lease,
or the Chinese landholders may do what they wish with their trees, including
cut them down, thus potentially releasing the saved carbon.122 One criticism
of FCOs is that the carbon savings are not permanent: The credits issued are
in contracts with terms that expire, and forests have an unfortunate
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121. Letter of Approval for Project of Facilitating Reforestation for Guangxi
Watershed Management in Pearl River Basin As a Clean Development Mechanism
Project by National Development and Reform Commission of the People’s Republic
of China (May 15, 2006), available at http://cdm.unfccc.int/UserManagement/
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122. Chrisopher Carr & Flavia Rosembuj, World Bank experiences in contracting for
emission reductions, 2 ENV. LIABILITY 114, 117 (2007).
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tendency to burn down even while on contract to accumulate carbon. The
World Bank is buying the tCERs in order to make the project financially
viable and buffer Northern investors from investment risk.123
The World Bank promotes forest carbon offset projects with great
124
vigor.
Through its Prototype Carbon Fund established in 1999, the Bank
pioneered a system whereby Northern investors – private businesses and
governments – could offset their carbon emissions through investments in
various Southern projects.125 The carbon offsets from each Bank venture are
distributed proportionately to the various entities, which in turn could use
them to offset carbon reduction requirements.126 That is to say, the Bank
facilitates continued use of GHG-producing fossil fuels by facilitating the
purchase of cheap carbon offsets in the developing world. The Bank’s
recently developed Carbon Finance Unit continues this work by eliciting
funds from Northern nations (in the Guangxi project, Spain and Italy) that
the Bank uses to buy emissions reduction credits in Southern nations.127
The World Bank has launched a Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
(FCPF) to facilitate FCOs.128 The Bank portrays the schemes as a way to halt
tropical deforestation, while helping Southern nations to capture their
“potential share in the multi-billion dollar global carbon market,”129 receive
appropriate technology130 and alleviate poverty.131 World Bank promotional
material for their BioCarbon Fund touts the contributions to sustainable
development, including new sources of employment, new sources of
revenue from forest products and selling carbon credits, and new technical
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capacity building in forestry.132 The Bank’s supporters cite this work as
contributing to “its mission of global public service.”133
This Guangxi project is aimed not just at building local capacity, but
testing a program of small-scale forestry projects, which will seed the
ground for a “much larger system of positive incentives and financing flows
in the future.”134 The FCPF is part of the World Bank’s heavy investment in
carbon financing; the Bank now manages ten carbon funds worth
$US2 billion with 16 governments and 64 private companies contributing.135
The Bank represented both buyers (Northern nations and industrial entities)
and sellers (Southern governments and communities) of these FCOs.136
Through the Bank’s participation, wealthy purchasers of carbon credits
are buffered from investment risk. The Bank assumes the risk that, for
example, the CDM’s EB will not approve a project. Once the project has
been approved, the seller (i.e., the Southern entity) bears the risk of not
delivering on the promised carbon. In an FCO, if they do not plant trees at
the rate promised or if a forest burns down, then they do not receive the
payment for the promised sequestered carbon.137 The Northern investors
have little to lose from these deals, and much to gain as they are allowed to
continue to pollute. The Bank’s guarantees to investors “triggered the
massive inflow of private money into the CDM.”138
Moreover, the Bank’s clients are bundling profit-making from carbon
trading with other forest-based or similar investments in Southern
communities. A World Bank Report notes that
[T]he most successful deals were those that went beyond contracting
for carbon and included other relationships, viz. equity, debt,
equipment sales, other commodity sales, etc. . . . For example, a
London-based carbon company reported in its public filings that it had
purchased an equity share in a sugar company in Ethiopia. We expect
such types of investment activity to continue and rapidly increase as

132. World Bank Carbon Finance Unit, Environmental and Social Benefits in the
BioCarbon Fund (May 15, 2004), http://carbonfinance.org/Router.cfm?Page=BioCF&FID
=9708&ItemID=9708&ft=DocLib&CatalogID=7031.
133. Karen DeGouve, Negotiating a Fair Price for CERs, in EQUAL EXCHANGE, supra
note 11 at 123.
134. World Bank Finance Unit, About Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF),
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carbon becomes just one of the many assets from which investors seek
to correctly value and grow.139
A World Resources Institute Report points out the lack of coherence in
World Bank climate change policy. The Bank seldom includes advice on
global climate change in its Country Assistance Strategies;140 it seldom
considers climate change impacts in its energy sector lending.141 An NGO’s
audit of World Bank energy policies found that between 1992 and 2004, 82
percent of all energy projects financed by the Bank shunted fossil fuels from
South to North, and that these projects, worth over $US10.7 billion,
overwhelmingly benefited Northern fossil fuel MNEs, of which Halliburton
was involved as developer, contractor, or investor in $US2.5 billion worth of
these projects.142 Whatever laudatory intentions it proclaims, it is difficult to
see how Bank policies promoting FCOs will fail to offer disproportionate
benefit the wealthy Northern investors that contribute to its carbon funds,
or how the Bank will successfully offset more than a fraction of GHG
emissions that its other projects cause.
One might be more sanguine about the Bank’s carbon investments if
they were simultaneously generating adaptation benefits for poor
communities in the global South. However, that is not necessarily the case.
About 7 percent of the Bank’s carbon portfolio lies in the Community
Development Carbon Fund (“CDCF”).143 According to that Fund’s website,
“[t]he single overarching factor, which defines this Fund and differentiates it
from other World Bank carbon funds, is the generation of community
benefits for the projects it finances.”144 That is to say, this Fund
“differentiates” from the other nine World Bank Carbon Funds because it
actually focuses on benefiting local communities where it is investing. CDCF “projects
are an opportunity for small communities in poorer countries to obtain
clean water, improve health conditions, create jobs for women, as much as it
is an investment in clean technologies that help reduce greenhouse gas

139.

Capoor & Ambrosi, supra note 47, at 25.

140. Jon Sohn, Smita Nakhooda, & Kevin Baumert, Mainstreaming Climate Change
Considerations at the Multilateral Development Banks, WORLD RESOURCE INSTITUTE ISSUE BRIEF
5 (July 2005).
141.

Id. at 6

142. Jim Vallette & Steve Kretzmann, The Energy Tug of War: The Winners and
Losers of World Bank Fossil Fuel Finance. Institute for Policy Studies Sustainable Energy
& Economy Network (2004), at 2.
143. World Bank Carbon Finance Unit, About Community Development
Carbon Fund (CDCF), http://carbonfinance.org/Router.cfm? Page=CDCF&ft=About.
144.
64

Id.

West

Northwest, Vol. 15, No. 1, Winter 2009

emissions and mitigate climate change.”145 The Chinese project – like 93
percent of all World Bank carbon projects – does not fall under the CDCF’s
aegis, and thus need not focus on these factors.

The Governments of Spain, Italy, and Norway
Spain and Italy are financing the Guangxi deal,146 and Norway is
allowing new domestic polluting energy generation in exchange for
promises from a developer to offset its carbon in Tanzania.147 As pilot
projects, these FCOs offer cheap ways to offset required emissions
reductions under the Kyoto Protocol and its successors. Norway has
recently announced it plans to be “carbon neutral” by 2030, partly through
investing huge funds in forest projects in developing nations.148 At the same
time, the nations can help fulfill their commitments to the E.U.’s target that
member states should be contributing 0.7 percent of GDP to Overseas
Development Assistance by 2015.149
Cutting GHG emissions sounds good to eco-minded citizens . . . until
we face the reality of what that might actually mean to our day-to-day lives
(e.g., higher taxes and fuel costs, curbs on where we can drive and when,
product bans). It is natural that elected officials, once they get the good
press that comes from being eco-friendly, will subsequently look for ways to
cushion the blows required GHG emissions may rain on their citizens and
their own political prospects.
Furthermore, as we can see in the World Bank’s promotional materials,
MNEs in Northern nations stand to profit not just through carbon offset
trading but through associated business ventures. Northern national
political leaders may thus be under strong pressure to help their MNEs find
“low hanging fruit” that allows them to offset required carbon reductions in
the cheapest way possible while finding new and novel ways to reap other
profits from the scheme.

China and the Global Environment Facility
Southern nations hope to attract Northern state and MNE technology
and funds through FCOs. The World Bank’s partner in helping Southern
nations comply with their obligations under Multilateral Environmental
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Agreements (MEAs) is the Global Environment Facility (GEF). The World
Bank is trustee of the GEF; it administers the GEF in cooperation with the
UNDP and U.N. Environment Programme (UNEP).150
While the World Bank facilitates and funds the FCOs for this CDM
project, China is also using GEF funding “provided for the overall umbrella
project” of a nature reserve of which this reforestation effort is apparently a
small part.151 Those industrial entities who stand to benefit financially from
these FCOs, and who the World Bank would be helping, include profitmaking timber companies.152
The World Bank notes that “[p]rivate
enterprises (e.g., logging companies or farms) could be directly involved in
the programs and measures designed to curb deforestation and
degradation.”153 NGOs protesting this scheme allege that it is “perverse” that
the World Bank’s policies that are ostensibly “pro-poor” would reward
industrial loggers who have traditionally contributed both to ecological
destruction and local impoverishment.154 The Guangxi validation report
expresses a concern about “diversion of official development assistance” to
this project that potentially benefits private interests; i.e., the private
logging concern that is the project developer.155 The entire response from
the project proponents, which apparently satisfied the verifiers, is that “[t]he
GEF fund will support the nature reserve management which is separated
and outside from this CDM project.”156
Nonetheless, it is difficult to avoid suspecting that China is leveraging
GEF and World Bank funds in support of a private timber concession. The
Chinese project participant listed on the Project Design and other

150. GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY, INSTRUMENT FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
RESTRUCTURED GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL FACILITY 7 (2004), http://thegef.org/GEF_
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documents is the “Xinghuan Forestry Development Company Ltd,”157 who
will be employing local villagers to do the forestry work and sharing the
profits with them. Note that none of the project documents reveal any more
about them; China’s Letter of Approval for the CDM project only authorizes
Xinghuan Forestry Development Company Ltd. to carry out the project.158
The few hits I received from Google were all in Chinese, making it difficult for
non-Chinese based NGOs to monitor or comment on how private sources
are profiting from the FCO.

FCOs, MNEs, and the Problem of Environmental Democracy
To date, FCOs, as part of the CDM or the voluntary market, are opaque
and impenetrable for citizens, NGOs, regulators, or lawyers wishing to
comment on, improve, or monitor the deals.
To be validated as a CDM project, public comments must be taken into
account.159 The Validation Report for the Guangxi project notes that “The
PDD has been made public by February 16, 2006 until April 1, 2006. No
stakeholder comments have been received.”160 If relevant stakeholders are
local citizens that might be affected by the project, would they know that the
project was open for comment? Would they have access to computers?
Would they have the political freedom to publicly oppose such a project?
Would they have the slightest concept of what the project was about? While
stakeholder comments are incorporated within the PDD,161 it is hard to
believe that rural people in China (or anywhere) understand carbon banking
well enough to participate meaningfully in their development.162
157. Facilitating Reforestation for Guangxi Watershed Management in Pearl River
Basin: CDM Project Activity Registration and Validation Report Form, July 25, 2006, at 1,
http://cdm.unfccc.int/UserManagement/FileStorage/L8UGEOV2FSX6D7BMUPUONPP
P6JCYVV.
158. Letter of Approval for Project of Facilitating Reforestation for Guangxi
Watershed Management in Pearl River Basin As a Clean Development Mechanism
Project by National Development and Reform Commission of the People’s Republic
of China, May 15, 2006, available at http://cdm.unfccc.int/UserManagement/
FileStorage/7Y41M57708ZDR95GDFS8LGOZLPC7ZL.
159. Jason Schwartz, ‘”Whose Woods These Are I Think I Know”: How Kyoto
May Change Who Controls Biodiversity’ 24 NYU Env. L. J. 421, 470 (2006).
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162. One director of an NGO seeking to monitor FCOs told me that many rural
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NGOs or individual concerned citizens could also make comments, if
they were aware of these projects existing, and if they could understand the
Byzantine ways of the CDM. I have been able to find no proposed FCO
projects on the CDM’s website, even though several that propose to use the
Climate, Community, & Biodiversity Alliance’s (CCBA) standards are
available on the CCBA’s website;163 thus you would have to know that a
project is using these voluntary standards in order to know where to look to
find the Project Design Document! The calculus equations164 of the PDD that
estimate carbon storage, abstruse terminology, and forests of acronyms all
add to the opacity.
As noted above, Environmental Democracy is an emerging
environmental human rights norm. As such, citizen watchdog groups should
be able to ensure that nations are fulfilling their emissions pledges. The
public – particularly those who are likely to be affected by a CDM forestry
scheme – should be able to review and comment before any trading scheme
is implemented, and should be able to prevent unjust trading schemes. In
fact, in an ideal environmental democracy, citizens whose forests are to be
preserved should propose, manage, and benefit from these offsets. In fact,
many current FCOs are imposed on local communities by governments or
are initiated between private actors and local elites.165 Stakeholder
participation is often minimal in CDM project verification.166 Even in
progressive voluntary codes that do develop criteria for environmental
democracy, such as the CCBA’s, citizens could not necessarily scuttle a
project, and certainly no standards require that local citizens actually
propose, manage, and/or own the projects. Whether under the CDM or the
voluntary market, citizen participation is expensive, and anything that adds
cost to the process lowers the profit to be made by Northern project
developers and traders.167 Under the CDM, no Environmental Impact
Assessments are required.168 Third parties may challenge CDM projects if

163. The Climate, Community & Biodiversity Alliance [CCBA], CCB Projects,
http://www.climate-standards.org/projects/index.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2008). I
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they suspect, for example, that the projects don’t meet “additionality”
requirements, assuming they can find any meaningful data about what is
being offset and whether or not the project would have happened anyway
without CDM assistance.169
Individual nations, through domestic
environmental laws, could allow their citizens to weigh in on how emissions
offsets will work in their nations; but this is not the prevalent scheme in the
South generally and in current FCO schemes in particular.170 Certainly,
citizens everywhere have little say in how emissions targets are set or what
kinds of offsets or trading are permitted between nations.
I thus believe the many current CDM and voluntary schemes violate
the emerging international environmental law principle for full participation
by all concerned citizens in environmental decision making, and violate the
fundamental human rights to participate and to access information about
matters that affect other fundamental rights. While private actors may not
be directly liable for customary international environmental law principles,171
host nations are required to protect their citizens from human rights
violations of private actors acting in their territory and home states are
required to monitor human rights violations committed by private actors
operating from their states.172

FCOs and CBDR
As discussed above, Northern nations are legally obliged under the
UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol and under customary international environmental
law to fund mitigation and adaptation strategies in the South that will help
avoid human rights and ecological cataclysms that result from the North’s
responsibility for creating global climate change.
FCO projects that respect CBDR and genuinely mitigate Northern
emissions while helping the South adapt to global climate change would
help fulfill this obligation; but projects that allow Northern actors to evade

mitigate or adapt to climate change . . . .” Art 4(1)(f). This language is convoluted
and vague, and it does not require EIAs of individual projects.
169. Or assuming they can actually find the PDD. As I note below, PDDs for
proposed CDM FCO projects are unavailable on the UNFCCC’s website; Kenneth
Berlin, Arresting Climate Change. SL098 ALI-ABA 79, 87 (2006).
170.
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172. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, The Nature of the General
Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add.13 (May 26, 1004); Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3, The Nature of States Parties Obligations, U.N. Doc.
E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990); JANET DINE, COMPANIES, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 179-181 (Cambridge, 2005).
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their legal responsibility to reduce their own emissions, and that further
undercut the South’s ability to adapt, violate the equity-enhancing
underpinnings of CBDR.
Even if they never explicitly cite the legal requirements of CBDR, the
managers of the World Bank’s various Carbon Funds acknowledge the
obligation that better-off States and private interests have to help the poor.
But in Guangxi, international funds provided by state and corporate actors
benefit private timber financial interests who are likely to profit
disproportionately from the CERs generated (as compared to members of
the communities whose land is used for the plantations and whose labor
may be compensated as forest laborers). The Carbon Funds help Northern
entities avoid reducing GHG emissions, and thus continue to profit from
their polluting industrial activities. In both China and Tanzania, to the
extent that sustainable development may occur, it seems ancillary, and such
goals are certainly not transparent or verifiable. In the decade since the
Kyoto Protocol was signed, rather than the rich helping the poor under the
legal mandate of the CBDR principle, the rich have exploited the climate
change legal regime to accrue wealth at the expense of the poor, as we shall
now see.

Turning Carbon into Cash
At the Bali UNFCCC COP, Northern nations, pressed by their private
businesses, pushed hard for deals to extend the amount and kinds of FCOs
allowed under the Kyoto Protocol and its successor.173 Adam Nathan,
communications director of the Carbon Markets Association, asserted that
“[n]egotiations in Bali cannot afford to fail,” as Kyoto nations are earning
billions of dollars of carbon credits under the current flexibility mechanisms.
For example, the E.U. gave away – free of charge – emissions trading credits
to over 11,000 companies, who thus received free assets – rather than
penalties or reduction mandates – for their polluting activities.174 A list of
the NGOs accredited to participate at UNFCCC conferences reveals a huge
array of business and trade organizations; these meetings resemble trade
conventions as much as they do environmental meetings.175
Much FCO financing comes from private investors, who do not see
themselves as bound by Kyoto Protocol Article 10’s requirement that parties
take local sustainable development priorities into account,176 whose
required adherence to CBDR is questionable, and who stand to make
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considerable money from FCO schemes.177 The regulatory complexity of
FCOs allows Northern parties to push for speed and ease over careful
attention to human rights norms, and makes it unlikely that Southern
parties will have the institutional capacity to negotiate adequately or
enforce human rights norms.178
Next I will turn to some of the private investors who profit from the
new commodity called carbon.

Project Developers
The Uchindile project is proposed by Green Resources, Ltd., a
Norwegian company that has purchased the land in Tanzania and will own
the CERs resulting from the reforestation project.179 Green Resources is a
for-profit company that employs 1500 people and holds more than 100,000
hectares of land in East Africa.180 Green Resources touts its mission “to fight
climate change through highly efficient afforestation181 projects that at the
same time benefit the poorest people in the world.”182 Green Resources
aims to be Africa’s “leading provider of carbon offsets.”183
Green Resources is the new name of another Norwegian company,
TreeFarms.184 Green Resources in turn possesses another subsidiary, Sao
Hill Industries, which “aims to be the leading forest products, building
material and transmission pole company in Eastern Africa.”185 In this case,
the raw material is trees, and sequestered carbon is among the many “forest
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While the two businesses are listed separately on that PDD, Tree Farms now seems to
have changed its name to Green Resources, merging the two businesses. See Green
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products” it sells. If approved, the CDM of the Kyoto Protocol would help
Green Resources sell validated carbon; i.e., a new “forest product.”
As TreeFarms has purchased land across East Africa, it has sought to
reshape human and ecological communities in order to earn profits for itself
and its investors. TreeFarms has been implicated in schemes that severely
undercut the ability of already poor people to make a basic living. In
Uganda, TreeFarms plantations – on land purchased for low prices from the
government – fomented widespread eviction and social unrest.186 Of course,
from the project documents, it is difficult to determine who would be liable
should human rights violations occur, or should the carbon allegedly
sequestered not materialize or be destroyed through fire or vandalism. We
know that Green Resources is related to TreeFarms only because they are
both listed on the PDD. Only a parenthetical phrase on Green Resources’
website mentions the connection.187
Janet Dine argues that “property” is not rights over things but rights
over people; She urges us to believe that the greater the power conferred to
the owner of that property right, the greater the responsibilities that the
property “owner” undertakes.188 Dine writes: “Of course, where the relevant
item is food or water, the freedom and liberty inherent in exercise of
property rights becomes a death warrant of those whose access to the item
is thereby restricted.”189 In Uganda, people were thrown off their land and
disconnected from their only source of food.190 In Tanzania, while TreeFarms
had promised steady employment to replace traditional grazing land, they
were only hiring local people to plant between December and March, and
were paying less than $US1 a day.191 Because land tenure was traditional
and not formal (i.e., no property deeds conferring a Northern notion of
property ownership), it is estimated that the villagers have lost more than 30
percent of their grazing and cropland, and some have not been compensated
for this loss.192 The PDD does report some of the uncharitable things local
villagers have to say about Green Resources,193 and reports from a survey
that 41 percent of locals said wages were low or paid late, and 38 percent
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said the company had not fulfilled promises it made when it acquired local
land.194
In Tanzania, TreeFarms leased its land from the government at
$US1.90 a year for 99 years.195 For the $US565,000 it will pay to Tanzania over 25
years, the company stands to make around $US27 million by selling carbon
offsets.196 It may be that Tanzania is part of a “race to the bottom” to become a
new kind of “pollution haven,”197 allowing the North to continue to pollute the
global atmospheric commons through cheap offsets that provide desperately
needed FDI. At any rate, this Northern company stands to benefit handsomely
from carbon, and the benefits to local Tanzanians seem small.
Northern Industries/Offset Purchasers
In addition to the value of forest products it would gain once any
carbon offset contracts were completed, TreeFarms signed an options
contract for $US4.50 per tonne of carbon with Industrikraft Midt-Norge, a
Norwegian power company.198 Why would Industrikraft Midt-Norge have
wished to purchase this carbon to be sequestered from reforestation at a
remote location in Tanzania? The company sought to build two large gasfired power plants in Norway, which alone would have increased Norway’s
GHG emissions 29 percent, and of course would have generated large profits
for the company.199 The corporation convinced various players in the
Norwegian government that they could offset new GHG emissions through
saving carbon cheaply in the South, such as through TreeFarms’ FCOs.200
Due in part to negative publicity about TreeFarms’ Uganda project,201
Industrikraft Midt-Norge seems to have withdrawn from purchasing these
particular FCOs; but the company’s website does assert that it will
“implement measures to compensate for its own CO2 emissions” within the
Kyoto Protocol framework, i.e., it will buy other CERs from other projects,

194.

Id. at 94.

195.

Lohmann, supra note 55, at 242.
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thus guaranteeing continued pollution through perpetuation of the
unsustainable fossil fuel economy of the North.202
Other offset purchasers in the “voluntary market” include other
industries looking for inexpensive ways to meet government-imposed
emissions reductions targets, businesses looking to gain positive publicity
by investing in high-profile carbon storage projects, and consumers looking
to offset their carbon-intensive lifestyles.203

Carbon Funds
Business is also booming for full-service carbon brokers, financial
institutions, and lawyers. As of 2006, 50 different carbon funds were buying
and selling CERs, either to entities who required reductions to meet GHG
reduction targets, or to speculators for whom “the CDM is seen as a financial
opportunity, similar to those in other commodity markets.”204 For example,
London-based Climate Change Capital “advises and invests in companies
who recognise that combating global warming is both a necessity and an
economic opportunity. Its activities, which also include investment
management and financing emissions reductions, aim to make the world’s
environment cleaner while delivering attractive financial returns.”205
Traditional investment firms are getting into the carbon commodity
business. For example, Merrill Lynch, in association with Australian
business Carbon Conservation, has just announced that it is financing a
high-profile, $US9-million deal to prevent deforestation on nearly 2 million
acres in Aceh, Sumatra.206 Merrill Lynch hopes to sell the carbon credits (for
which they’re paying $US4 each) at a profit, and Carbon Conservation hopes
to “become the amazon.com of the Amazon.”207
A carbon fund may well buy, and then resell, Green Resources’ CERs.
From the seeds planted in Tanzanian pasture sprouts storage units for

202. Industrikraft Midt-Norge: Owners, http://www.industrikraft.no/english/
index.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2008).
203. Kanter, supra note 109; Katherine Hamilton, Ricardo Bayon, & Amanda
Hawn, ‘Carving a Niche for Forests in the Voluntary Carbon Markets’ in Streck et al.,
supra note 23 at 293; Clean Air – Cool Planet, A CONSUMER’S GUIDE TO RETAIL
CARBON OFFSET PROVIDERS (2006) at iii, available at http://www.cleanaircoolplanet.org/ConsumersGuidetoCarbonOffsets.pdf.
204. Mark Meyrick, What is a Fair Price for CDM Credits?, in EQUAL EXCHANGE, supra
note 11, at 102-03.
205. Careers, Climate Change Capital, http://www.climatechangecapital.com/
pages/jobdetail.asp?id=533& (last visited Oct. 20, 2008).
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carbon, a new commodity that can be repeatedly bought and sold for a profit
in international markets.

Law Firms
Many corporate law firms are positioning themselves as advisors to
governments and “deep pocket” investors who are looking to understand,
and profit from the CDM and voluntary carbon markets.208 For example,
Clifford Chance will “advise on climate change issues. . . to help in futureproofing your business and maximizing opportunities;”209 The PDD does not
reveal who has been advising TreeFarms, but it is a good bet they have
carbon lawyers on retainer.

Designated Operational Entities, Standards Certifiers, and
Consultants
The FCO system benefits another class of private enterprises that verify
technical standards in projects or consult with project developers to help
them navigate the abstruse technical and legal requirements.
An Executive Board (“EB”) accredits proposed projects under the
210
CDM.
The CDM EB is underfunded and overburdened with duties, and
thus contracts out verification and certification to private firms known as
Designated Operational Entities (DOEs); i.e., private companies who are
market actors.211 NGOs sometimes allege that global accounting and
standards firms are “captured” by their clients.212 Such enforcement “can
take place in a club-like atmosphere of repeat players with a stake in
maintaining their reputation within an industry.”213 Carbon verifiers or
consultants may act as a DOE for a given project, but be a project broker,
certifier, or consultant for different carbon offset projects; thus DOEs who
wish to be hired in the future have a strong incentive to verify proposed
CDM projects to maintain collegial relationships with prospective
employers.
TÜV SÜD, based in Germany but with offices at 130 sites worldwide, is
the DOE for both the China and Tanzania projects. It has 10,000 employees

210. Benedict Kingsbury, Environmental Governance As Administration, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 63, supra note 5, at 75.
211. Id. at 76; Silveira da Rocha Sampaio, Seeing the Forest for the Treaties: Evolving
Debates on CDM Forest and Forestry Project Activities 10 Years After the Kyoto Protocol 144, 147
(Pace U. Sch. Of Law, Working Paper Series 2007), available at http://ssrncom/
abstract=1011187.
212.

Ratner, supra note 20, at 823.

213.
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and earned more than $US1 billion in 2005.214 It is both a DOE verifier and a
project broker, having worked on over 200 climate change projects in over 30
countries.215 It is the only CDM accreditor for FCOs under the Kyoto
Protocol.216 (For most CDM projects, yet an additional DOE must be hired to
verify that GHGs were actually reduced.217 It is not clear how this will work
for FCO CDM projects, given that only one DOE has been certified.)
TreeFarms has also employed the consultancy services of SGS, a
Swiss-based multinational enterprise whose $US4.3 billion a year
verification, testing, and certification business is rapidly expanding into the
carbon project verification and advisory market.218 SGS sometimes serves as
a DOE, but also works with companies to help them comply and plan their
CDM projects.219 (A company cannot do both on one CDM project, except for
small-scale forestry projects.220) Consultants such as SGS have sometimes
been paid in carbon offset reduction “Certified Emissions Reduction” units,
giving them a greater financial stake in generating as many CERs as
possible.221
Thus multiple corporate entities may profit handsomely from this FCO.
In the financial market that has sprung from the global climate change legal
regime, trees have become greenhouse gas storage devices; quanta of
carbon are now commodities that can be exchanged multiple times to profit
disparate actors. Among those profiting less are the government of
Tanzania, which receives very little financial benefit; the local people seem
to profit even less. Underlying all of this is the startling realization that even
under the most optimistic projections, no GHG reductions result for CDM
FCOs under the Kyoto Protocol. Carbon offsets merely allow the same
amount of continued GHG emissions in the North. MNEs need not change
how they do business, need not develop the technologies that will foment a
transition from a fossil fuel economy. FCOs and other carbon offsets

214. CDM Information Platform, Office of National Coordination on Climate
Change, http://cdm.ccchina.gov.cn/website/cdm/pdf/DOE/DOE38.pdf (last visited Oct.
20, 2008).
215.
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216.
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Carr & Rosembuj, supra note 15, at 50-1.

218. See PDD Uchindile, supra note 55, at 5, 37 for SGS involvement; see also
http://www.climatechange.sgs.com/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2008); and SGS, SGS 2007
ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2008), http://www.sgs.com/sgs_2007_fyr_en.pdf.
219. SGS, SGS CLIMATE CHANGE PROGRAMME 3, 6 (2005), http://wwwclimate
change.sgs.com/sgs_climate_change_program.pdf.
220.
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221. Martijn Wilder & Monique Willis, CER Pricing: Legal Influences, in EQUAL
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present new and innovative ways to profit by inventing and controlling new
forms of property in faraway lands, often at the expense of people who
hitherto had competing claims to that property.222

Standard Setting and Regulation
Validation as a CDM project requires meeting technical requirements
about carbon calculation, leakage, and additionality.223 The standards for
what counts as “sustainable development” or for what project participants
have to do to ensure socioeconomic benefits of local communities are more
ambiguous.224 The approved methodologies for reforestation for CDM
projects do not include social or human rights criteria.225 CDM projects
must take into account comments of local participants, but need not heed
those or cancel a project if local opposition is strong.226 Although the CDM
subjects MNE project developers to “hard” obligations,227 the standards that
regulate those obligations are lax, and, as noted above, the standards are
monitored by MNEs who may have self-interested business reasons for not
monitoring too closely.
The WWF and other NGOs have developed a “gold standard” tool that
can be used by CDM project developers to develop “quality” carbon offsets.
The Gold Standard has stricter “additionality” requirements and attends to
some sustainable development goals: for example, project developers must
“invite” local people to two consultations on the project (which they would
not have to do otherwise for a normal CDM project).228 However, FCOs are
not eligible to use this tool.229
Voluntary market FCOs are subject to no mandatory regulations. Into
this breach launches a number of private initiatives designed, and
sometimes competing, to regulate these projects.
The social and

222. Lohmann, supra note 55, and Griffiths, supra note 23 document this
proposition extensively.
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225. UNFCC CDM, Methodologies, Afforestation / Reforestation Methodologies,
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228. The Gold Standard Fdn., Introducing the Gold Standard, http://www.
cdmgoldstandard.org/uploads/file/CS_intro.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2008).
229. THE GOLD STANDARD FDN., THE GOLD STANDARD MANUAL FOR CDM PROJECT
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environmental standards generated by the Climate, Community &
Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA) are the most rigorous I have read, and also selfbilled as “the most widely used and respected international standard,” with
nine projects being validated and about 100 more in the pipeline.230 The
CCBA seeks to “[i]dentify projects that simultaneously address climate
change, support local communities and conserve biodiversity” and
“[m]itigate risk for investors and increase funding opportunities for project
developer[s].”231 Like other environmental certification schemes (e.g., the
Forest Stewardship Council’s sustainable timber certification), project
developers using these standards hope they promote stability and connote
quality, and thus will fetch premium prices from sophisticated consumers.232
For example, the CCBA standards guide Merrill Lynch’s Sumatra FCO;233 by
using the standards, Merrill Lynch invests in “exceptional, high-quality (and
resilient) projects most likely to avoid implementation roadblocks and
deliver their stated outcome, including generating credible and robust
carbon offsets.”234
Developers using CCBA’s 2008 draft standards can earn two different
levels of certification, with the “gold” level reserved for projects that
demonstrate some “extra” combination of, among others, “exceptional
community benefits” (including being “explicitly pro-poor”), “exceptional
biodiversity benefits,” and “climate change adaptation benefits” (focusing on
projects that “will provide significant support to assist local communities
and/or biodiversity to adapt to the impacts of climate change”).235 This
means that projects can be approved for CCBA certification and not meet
these requirements. Still, both standards employ rigorous methodologies
to measure leakage, prevent false additionality, result in net gains for
biodiversity, and guarantee net climate benefits.236 Furthermore, for basic
certification, project developers must result in “net positive community
impacts for each constituent socioeconomic or cultural group,”237 account for

230. CCBA, CLIMATE, COMMUNITY, & BIODIVERSITY PROJECT DESIGN STANDARDS 4
(Draft Second Edition, Version 2.0 2008), http://www.climate-standards.org/
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231.

Id.

232. Jason Morrison & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Private and Quasi-Private Standard
Setting in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 498, supra note 5, at 504; see
Forest Stewardship Council, http://www.fsc.org/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2008).
233.

Gunther, supra note 114.

234. CCBA, CCB STANDARDS (2007), http://www.climate-standards.org/pdf/
2007_11_02_CCBS_factsheet_Web.pdf.

78

235.

Id. at 31-33.

236.

Id.

237.

Id., at 24.

West

Northwest, Vol. 15, No. 1, Winter 2009

and mitigate offsite impacts238 and have a monitoring plan for onsite project
community impacts.239
CCBA standards are apparently being used in the Tanzania project. In
fact, the CDM project documents do not specify the source of standards they
are using. Only by reading the CCBA website do I find that they cite the
Tanzanian project as using their standards.240
CCBA is a partnership between NGOs (e.g., CARE, The Nature
Conservancy, Wildlife Conservation Society), research institutions, and
corporations.241 The latter includes BP, Intel, SC Johnson, Weyerhaeuser,
and carbon-related businesses that stand to profit from FCOs like
Sustainable Forestry Management242 and GFA Consulting Group.243 Groups
like TNC or CARE wish to implement some form of regulation that support
their goals – preserving biodiversity or alleviating poverty. Carbon
businesses may accept such voluntary regulation in order to advertise their
corporate social responsibility to consumers, to show that industry can
regulate itself (thus obviating the need for more formal legal strictures), and
to invest in carbon offsets that are of recognized quality, thus generating
CERs that fetch higher prices.244
While potentially solving some problems, voluntary standards may
raise others. Will the NGOs or standards writers or certifiers involved be
liable if human rights abuses (e.g., evictions from land, starvation) occur as
a result of these FCOs? Will a participating NGO be co-opted by the
partnership and no longer be able to advocate and critique objectively the

238.
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240. CCB Projects, supra note 163. I find no mention of any standards at all,
beyond the technical calculations the CDM requires. In fact, only on the CCBA
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transparency; I could not locate the PDD on the UNFCCC project webpage, another
problem for “environmental democracy!”
241. CCB:
Members,
http://www.climate-standards.org/pdf/2007_11_02_
CCBS_factsheet_Web.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2008).
242. Sustainable Forestry Management’s “principal revenues will be derived
from supplying and trading carbon dioxide emission credits and offsets in the carbon
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Forestry Management: About Us, http://www.sfm.bm/Home/AboutF.htm (last visited
Oct. 20, 2008).
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possible damaging aspects of these FCOs?245 MNEs are driven to achieve
maximum economic value for their stakeholders: Will these MNEs apply
voluntary regulatory brakes when profits are at stake? Furthermore, do these
kinds of standards contravene the legal obligations that states have to
regulate their own environmental and human rights destinies?246 Who will
enforce the standards and impose penalties if the project developer doesn’t
deliver on its promises?247
Private codes may result in environmental protections as rigorous as
more formal, state-run legal codes; and, indeed, the CCBA’s standards do
provide stricter protections than those named under the formal climate legal
regime. But, such voluntary codes nonetheless may reflect fewer nonbusiness interests (e.g., promoting human rights or environmental protection), and will be less likely to be enforced through the state’s official
legal mechanisms.248 That may be precisely the point – as Morrison & RohtArriaza express it, such standards “seek to change behavior through a
complex mix of incentives and do not rely primarily on external, deterrencebased enforcement.”249 Forces behind these codes may indeed be seeking to
shape the content of future, formal legal standards.250 If shown to work, the
voluntary standards would present a low-cost regulatory option for
participating private actors – low cost because it has already been
developed and shown to work, and is already in effect for private actors who
are designing and implementing their methodologies.
Whatever the incentive for participants in the CCBA or other
voluntary standards, for FCOs, the CCBA’s code is more rigorous and affords
more protections – for forests, for local people – than any existing formal
legal standards, including those of the CDM. As in any new legal/policy
instrument, CCBA’s standards may not work perfectly at present. Of the
three comments received during the Uchindile public participation process
(and again, these comments are available and transparent on the CCBA’s
website, not the UNFCCC’s website), one anonymous submission called into
question the financial aspects of the plan, and alleged the project is nonadditional, given that Green Resources’ Sao Hill timber subsidiary is still
operating in the area and might well continue to operate even without CDM
approval. Furthermore,
[t]he monitoring of sustainable development criteria is lacking in the
CDM, but an additional endorsement by CCB certainly requires adequate
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provisions for the inclusion and benefit of affected rural villages. Many
villagers, as reported in the PDD, feel that Green Resources has broken
promises it made when the village decided to cede its customary land to
the district council for allotment to Green Resources. . . . Uchindile
villagers have no ownership of the carbon, no ownership of the trees, and
no ownership of the profits derived from harvesting.251
Clearly, even the additional voluntary safeguards on top of the CDM’s
lax safeguards mean that MNEs, as they stake out new legal and physical
territory in host nations, may still be evading formal regulation that protects
the climate, forests, and local communities. This does not mean the CCBA’s
standards themselves fall short; but it does suggest that those standards
may need tighter oversight in how they are verified, implemented and
monitored. Currently, if an FCO in the voluntary market uses a voluntary
standards instrument but then violates those standards, who will hold them
to their word? What domestic or international legal forum will enforce a
voluntary code of conduct?
In FCOs, so much is at stake – global profits, local livelihoods, human
and ecological community survival – and so little formal domestic or
international law regulates the actors who have much to lose and to gain.

Conclusion: Moral Deflection Devices, Profit, International Law,
and the Future of the Planet
Writing about the growing trend to transform water from a public
good to a privatized resource, McDonald & Ruiters describe age of
commodification, where:
the transformation of all social relations to economic relations,
subsumed by the logic of the market and reduced to the crude calculus
of profit . . . Commodification entails the transformation of
relationships, formerly untouched by commerce, into commercial
relationships. Under capitalism, many goods and services which
previously had no market value or were self-provided within
households have been brought into the market fold and mass
production. New commodities are created with the expansion of
markets to new geographic areas and new sectors that may not yet
have been marketized.252

251. CCBA, Projects, Uchindile Public Comments, Comment No. 3, Sept. 5,
2007, http://www.climate-standards.org/projects/uchindile_comments.html.
252. David A. McDonald & Greg Ruiters, Introduction to THE AGE OF COMMODITY: WATER
PRIVATIZATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 3, 21 (David A. McDonald & Greg Ruiters, eds., 2005).
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Goaded by scientists-turned-politicians and politicians-turned
scientists,253 citizens have come to value carbon. As carbon has become
reified as a “thing” to be valued, it has acquired legal value, and has become
subject to legal norms. Carbon’s value was to be safeguarded using the
guiding ethical and legal framework of CBDR. But the legal norms have
facilitated the transformation of carbon into a commodity with precious
economic value. FCOs have been labeled “CO2lonialism:” by securing large
tracts of Southern forests, Northern consumers and industries can continue
business as usual and need make no painful changes in lifestyle, or make
the difficult investments to transition to a post-hydrocarbon economy.254
Just as in traditional colonialism, once carbon was commodified, an array of
actors has stepped in to profit from our concern, standing CBDR on its head
by investing in Southern forests to ease transfer of wealth from South to
North. The mechanisms they have derived to finance adaptation to climate
change – a mere 2 percent surcharge on profit-making CDM CERs, the
voluntary market – often privilege financial profit for the North over genuine
adaptation that foments social or ecological resiliency in the South.
As long as they are traded for rights to continue to pollute, FCOs do
not reduce global carbon emissions. Thus far, too often they have been
anti-democratic devices that forestall formal regulations, forestall a
transition from a fossil fuel guzzling economy, and forestall development of
new, Earth-friendly technologies. If ever a multilateral environmental
agreement had the potential to transform the legal environment around
which private actors work across borders, the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol –
designed to avert widespread global catastrophe to human and nonhuman
communities – was it. But the climate change legal regime has been coopted by commodification and profit, aided by Northern government leaders
fearful of their own political futures, Northern consumers wishing to
continue our own profligate lifestyles, Northern NGOs pursuing
environmental or social goals through well meaning but sometimes myopic
policies, Southern leaders who may profit individually from these deals or
who may be desperate for FDI for their nations,255 World Bank officials
pursuing development-as-usual, and, of course, all the private investors and
shareholders who can benefit from a booming carbon industry unfettered by
sufficient formal regulatory control. Through forest carbon offsets, Northern
private actors control lives and lands in impoverished nations whose

253. Scientists have been issuing increasingly “heated” warnings on global
climate change in public, e.g. NAS, supra note 7; for an analysis of science as
politicians on behalf of the environment, see DAVID TAKACS, THE IDEA OF BIODIVERSITY
(1996). For politicians turned scientists, see AL GORE, AN INCONVENIENT TRUTH (2006).
254. HUMPHREYS supra note 23, at 208; Lohmann, supra note 55, at 344; Erasker,
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communities have little ability to understand what is happening to them,
never mind fight it.
At the same time, tropical (and temperate) forests – with their
beautiful species and robust ecosystems and ability to store carbon –
disappear at alarming rates.256 As they go, so goes the social and ecological
resiliency that these forests provide, and thus neighboring humans also lose
their ability to adapt to climate change.
So what do we do? If we care about mitigating greenhouse gas
accumulation, helping poor (and wealthy) communities adapt, and
preserving all of the values/services of forests, how can we make this
happen?
To assuage our guilt, some Northern consumers turn to voluntary
offsets. Like indulgences that wiped away sins in the Middle Ages, voluntary
offsets illustrate “moral deflection devices,” instruments that allow us to feel
better about ourselves while continuing to live lives that harm people far
from our sights.257 But if we – we in the North who possess the wealth
derived from exploiting the planet’s resources and fouling the global
atmospheric commons – took the legal obligation of CBDR seriously, we
would invest in forest carbon, but not as offsets that allow us to continue to
pollute and allow the already-wealthy to profit from that pollution.
Nations would have to commit to real, quantifiable, verifiable, stricter
(than currently named) reductions in their GHG emissions. That would
mean placing real, quantifiable, verifiable, stricter restrictions on the
industries that are primarily responsible for these emissions, and real,
quantifiable, verifiable restrictions on citizen consumers who demand the
products that lead industries to pollute. It also means that Northern
nations take responsibility to help Southern nations fulfill their own
responsibilities to mitigate and adapt to climate change, through
development and dissemination of clean technology and through direct aid
that helps bolster social and ecological defenses against the coming climate
change catastrophes that will disproportionately harm the Southern poor.
This is real aid, guided by the principle of CBDR, over and above the meager
2 percent-of-CERs fee that is currently placed on profit-generating CDM
projects. Only after that, within the formal strictures of a climate treaty,
would nations be allowed to “offset” – and perhaps garner carbon credits
they could sell on an open market. This would give incentive to actually
reduce GHGs, and would still provide a mechanism for investing in FCOs –

256. Pagiola et al., supra note 88, at 1; Robert O’Sullivan, ‘Reducing Emissions
from Deforestation in Developing Countries: An Introduction’ in Streck et al, supra
note 23, at 179; United Nations Environment Programme, Reducing Emissions From
Deforestation: A Key Opportunity for Achieving Multiple Benefits 12 (Nairobi, 2007).
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and the array of benefits they potentially provide – within the formal treaty
regime.
Citizens should demand that their nations’ stated GHG reduction
commitments are real, verifiable, and quantifiable, strict, and not “offset”
elsewhere. They might demand rigorous adherence not just to CBDR, but to
the preventative and polluter pays norms of international environmental
law. For example, the United States Superfund/CERCLA law imposed a tax
on polluting industries that would be available for cleaning up toxic messes
if the original polluter could not be found or could not pay.258 Why not a
similar tax on the worst GHG emitters? Exxon-Mobil’s profits in 2007 were a
staggering $US40.6 billion dollars.259 A one-tenth-of-one-percent tax on
those profits would net $US40 million from that one MNE alone – about the
same amount as all Northern nations spent last year on total adaptation aid
to Southern nations!260 Some proportion of this could be spent on carefully
managed forest projects that preserve biodiversity at the same time they
sequester carbon and help local communities adapt to climate change.
Private actors seem not only to evade formal regulation of their
activities; operating in a legal vacuum, they seem to have captured the
regulatory apparatus, and with the aid of IFIs and NGOs, they are writing
new regulations that allow them to profit from the GCC legal regime. They
have created a new industry worth billions of dollars. Northern consumers
abet this effort; we wish to continue our own over-consuming lifestyles that
lead to excessive “luxury” emissions (as opposed to “survival” emissions
from the South).
But some voluntary standards, especially the gold certification level
promoted by the CCBA, are nonetheless superior to a weak formal
international legal regime that neither has named strict standards nor
evolved a regulatory apparatus capable of regulating private actors in the
CDM or voluntary market for FCOs. Thus the voluntary standards emerge as
valuable tools we can use both as legal mechanisms in their own right, and
as templates for formal international legal efforts to derive rules for
regulating FCOs such that they genuinely mitigate GHGs, and help Southern
human and nonhuman communities adapt to climate change.
Lawyers interested in environmental preservation and human rights
have an obligation in all this. Global climate change and deforestation, like
so many other global problems, points to the absence of a robust system of
international environmental law, with no rigorously codified, precise

258. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675, 9613(f) (2006).
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POST, Feb. 2, 2008, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2007/02/01/AR2007020100714.html.
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principles and concrete means of enforcement. The Preventative and
Polluter Pays Principles, the emerging norms of Environmental Democracy,
and, especially, CBDR, must be made more precise and thus justiciable by
citizens anywhere whose legal rights are violated by unjust FCOs (or any
other environmental norm violation). Lawyers can help national leaders
craft legal responses that indicate that governments believe these norms are
binding opinio juris. As such, these norms must find their way into the
successor to the Kyoto Protocol and other multilateral environmental
agreements. Lawyers can help design strict forms of enforcement through
an international body attached to the UNFCCC or through domestic
applications. These norms should become cornerstones of domestic and
international policy, the standards by which all policy and actions are
judged.
The voluntary market continues to hold promise as a way to mitigate
greenhouse gas buildup, help poor communities adapt, fulfill the mandates
of CBDR, and preserve all the values of forests. Several sets of competing
regulatory standards are vying for market share. I would suggest the COP to
the UNFCCC come up with one set of standards, perhaps drawing from the
best of the voluntary standards, but with stronger principles for respecting
local human rights. The CCBA standards – particularly their gold level –
seem a good place to start, as these standards do attend not only to
ecological values that forests provide, but also to the needs of people
dependant on those forests. If reality does not always live up to the promise
of the norms for regulating a nascent commodity in this nascent industry –
as the Tanzania case study above suggests – that does not mean that stricter
guidelines, stricter monitoring, and stricter enforcement could not improve
application of these norms.
Furthermore, the future of FCOs should lie not in “junk” carbon, but
rather in “boutique” carbon, i.e., asking citizens and corporations to take
CBDR as an ethical and legal principle seriously, and invest in the best
possible FCOs to preserve the forests that help communities adapt and that
preserve biodiversity, but do so without destroying local livelihoods, and
doing so in a way that generates profits for – and derives from the wishes
of – local communities. Particularly were these boutique carbon FCOs to
command higher prices on an international market, they could then become
the standard,261 crowding out the market in inferior FCOs that neither offer
genuine adaptation nor assurances that local people derive the bulk of the
benefits and guide the direction of the deals.
Lawyers ought to comment more frequently and more rigorously on
proposed CDM FCO (or other kinds of CDM) projects that seem
questionable from scientific, legal (environmental or human rights) or

261. This is what Merrill Lynch is banking on in their Sumatra deal. Gunther,
supra note 114.
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ethical perspectives. A first step would be to demand that the CDM EB
actually post these proposed projects where they are legally required to do
so! When the EB makes decisions that we feel fulfill neither the Kyoto
Protocol’s explicit legal norms nor the customary norms of international
environmental law, we can appeal the EB’s decisions. We can use existing
international human rights law mechanisms to complain about FCOs that
do not protect human rights. While private actors notoriously elude
international human rights law duties, all nations have a duty to respect,
protect, and fulfill human rights. When Southern nations allow FCOs that
force people off their land, they are failing in their duty to respect; i.e., they
are directly denying human rights to their people. When they fail to control
FCOs through legislation and policies, they are failing in their duty to protect
their peoples’ human rights. When Northern nations allow their private
actors to avoid legal mandates through questionable human rights
activities, they, too, are failing in their responsibilities to protect human
rights. Nations that do not proactively seek to regulate potential human
rights activities of their private actors, even if they occur abroad, are evading
their duty to fulfill human rights.
We can use various human rights fora (e.g., complaint mechanisms)
and regional courts, using Earthjustice’s landmark hearing on behalf of the
Inuits before the Inter American Commission on Human Rights as one
template.262 We can scrutinize Norway’s plans to become carbon neutral by
investing over a half-billion per year in FCOs: if Norway is acting qua
Norway, it must develop and follow a set of human rights principles to guide
these offset projects. We can more carefully codify CBDR commitments,
both in the successor to the Kyoto Protocol and elsewhere, and pursue
violations through the International Court of Justice. Furthermore, if any of
these FCOs occur in the 40 European nations who are signatories to the
Aarhus Convention, we can investigate whether local people’s full rights to
participate in environmental decision making have been observed, and file
complaints accordingly. New European-based public interest environmental
law firms like Client Earth263 can bring suits against European nations (all of
whom are Kyoto signatories) who are allowing their private actors to
develop human rights violating projects and whose private actors are
benefiting from trade in the E.U. trading scheme.

262. Petition to the Inter American Commission on Human Rights Seeking
Relief from Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions
of the United States (submitted Dec. 7, 2005), http://www.earthjustice.org/library/
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The U.N. Commission on Human Rights has proposed a set of legal
norms to constrain the actions of transnational corporations.264 Ideally,
these norms would confer rights to be held by individuals, justiciable in any
domestic courts (or perhaps some international legal fora), actionable
against private entities who transgress the norms. These legal norms would
bypass the legal stranglehold of nation states, who, as duty bearers and
prosecutors under international law often lack the means or incentives to
enforce them, and whose direct rights as nations are often not infringed by
environmental transgressions. Developing a legal system to guide FCOs and
thus help people adapt to the ravages of global climate change while
preserving the Earth’s gorgeous biological resources would be a good place
to implement development of such norms. We could start by forging a clear
system of rights that must be respected when implementing FCOs, from
which corresponding duties would inhere to all actors, state and non-state,
who participate in such FCOs. Or we could start by naming appropriate
duties, applicable to all actors, and build a system of liability and
enforcement to prevent and punish breaches of such duties.265
Global climate change has the potential to turn the natural world on
its head and to destroy human communities, rich and poor, which depend
on the natural world. To prevent these catastrophes, we need to turn the
international legal world on its head. We need a system of international law
powerful enough to preserve at least slivers of forest, scraps of biodiversity,
and shreds of human dignity. The legal principles we need – preventative,
polluter pays, environmental democracy and a host of environmental human
rights, CBDR – are there, as are some strong codes of voluntary standards
that provide a starting point for formal lawmaking. Missing is precision,
enforcement, justiciability and the will to shape and use international law to
de-emphasize the nation state, and to tame “the market” and its relentless
commodification of the Earth’s social and natural assets.

264. U.N. Comm. On Human Rights [UNCHR], Sub-Comm. On the Promotion
& Protection of Human Rights, 55th session, Agenda item 4, Economic, Social & Cultural
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